Tuesday, December 4, 2012

Marital Privilege


Marital Privilege 1st Dist. People v. Trzeciak, 2012 IL App (1st) 100259 (May 9, 2012) Cook Co., 3rd Div. (SALONE) Reversed and remanded. Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of first degree murder, and 50-year sentence was enhanced by 40 years for use of firearm in murder. Court erred in admitting testimony of Defendant's wife which should have been excluded as marital privilege. Statute prohibits testimony as to communications and admissions made as to any private conversation between husband and wife during the marriage, regardless of whether marriage was harmonious. (STEELE, concurring; MURPHY, dissenting.)

DUI 3d Dist

DUI 3d Dist. People v. Farris, 2012 IL App (3d) 100199 (April 10, 2012) Kankakee Co. (HOLDRIDGE) Affirmed. State appealed order granting DUI Defendant's petition to rescind statutory summary suspension (SSS) and granting Defendant's motion to suppress evidence from blood alcohol test using blood forcibly drawn from Defendant by hospital personnel at instruction of police officer. Law enforcement has no statutory right to use force to extract blood sample if Defendant refused to cooperate. Defendant's refusal to comply with request for sample is sufficient to justify SSS, for purpose of protecting public from intoxicated drivers, and thus forced sample collection serves no legitimate law enforcement purpose. Court properly denied State's motion to amend officer's sworn report, as proposed amendment would have prejudiced Defendant and likely introduced element of surprise. (O'BRIEN, concurring; WRIGHT, concurring in part and dissenting in part.)

Newly elected States Attorney


http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-12-03/news/ct-tl-lake-review-panel-20121203_1_nerheim-wrongful-convictions-review-panel

Friday, April 9, 2010

lawyerpissios: Drug Cases

lawyerpissios: Drug Cases

Reasonable Doubt

Reasonable Doubt
U.S. v. Milbourn, No. 08-2525 (April 7, 2010) S.D. Ind., Indianapolis Div. Affirmed
Record contained sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction on charges of conspiracy to intimidate or interfere with third-parties' use of their home on account of their race by burning cross on front lawn of said individuals' home. While defendant argued that evidence failed to establish that he was motivated by bi-racial makeup of occupants of home, record showed that defendant had uttered to others that he had "burned a cross on a nigger's yard." Moreover, jury could properly have viewed burning cross as evidence of racism and as threatening act of intimidation.